Slow March to War -- The Backroom Buildups
The scenario had years a-building. Ever since the end of the Great War in
1918, U.S. Navy people had looked at Japan with increasing concern. By the
1920s, the Navy's quiet backroom War Plans office had begun to develop what
became known as Plan Orange -- upgraded now and then, this was the scheme for
countering a Japanese naval attack in the Pacific. During this period, a
civilian journalist, British-born Hector C. Bywater, European naval
correspondent for The New York Times, The New York Herald, and The Baltimore
Sun, wrote two books, the latter titled "The Great Pacific War", in which he
(prophetically) outlined how the Japanese would attack in the Pacific,
notably at the Philippines. But the U.S. had been a major player in the
postwar naval disarmament conferences, times seemed good, Americans wanted no
further parts of warlike functions since the "war to end wars" had been
fought, and funding for the Army and Navy was both small and begrudged.
Despite the Navy's ships being largely obsolescent at best, the election of
Herbert Hoover as President in 1928 saw no new naval ship funding at all
during his Administration.
The subsequent 1932 election of Franklin D. Roosevelt made a Navy enthusiast
President, a man who had served previously as Assistant Secretary of the
Navy, as once had his older cousin, former President Theodore Roosevelt.
Entering his first 4-year term as the Depression was hitting its dismal low,
among Roosevelt's first moves was getting naval funding upped sharply, with
new warships in mind. Among other changes, the former Plan Orange would
become known as Rainbow, its regular upgrades numbered in sequence. The Fleet
began to slowly improve. Its higher-ups' attention to intelligence, however,
did not increase apace.
The halfway mark of Roosevelt's second term saw marked Navy improvement and
enlargement, with numerous new warships of all types being designed and
built, though the Army did not do nearly as well equipment-wise.
By this time, however, Naval Intelligence had had a young middle-grade
officer in Japan as a naval attache -- Ellis M. Zacharias, who spoke the
language and made it his business to meet people and learn things. He sent
back numerous illuminating reports . But his recipients' offices were still
small and backroomy; indeed, to be assigned to Naval Intelligence was
considered almost a career dead end. However, by the time war broke out in
Europe in September of 1939, cryptologists of the Army and Navy, working with
the Department of State, had learned how to decrypt the supposedly
impenetrable Japanese diplomatic code. To do this required a special machine
as well as excellent knowledge of Japanese. Code-named the "Purple Machine",
or simply "Purple", its product was called "Magic". This considerable
accomplishment was most useful -- if it were analysed by experts and then one
paid attention to it, which did not necessarily occur. That left the Navy a
still-undecipherable Japanese code. Named JN-25, it was the one used by the
Imperial Japanese Navy.
The gradual enlargement of Japanese activity, first in Manchuria in 1931,
then in Formosa, and finally on mainland Chinese soil by the mid-1930s, the
USN had been stirred to its keel by the unprovoked Japanese air attack on the
little gunboat USS PANAY in the Yangtse River in 1937. From that moment on,
more attention began to be paid to intelligence matters. But this was yet
relative.
Japanese intelligence was still back-seated when war broke out in Europe in
September of 1939. U.S. naval interest turned primarily to Nazi Germany and
its vaunted Kriegsmarine, especially its U-boat threat in the Atlantic, a
position enhanced by the President's own strong Anglophilism, and
remembrances of the Great War among senior flag officers. One of these was
Ernest J. King. Now a vice-admiral, his lifelong connections had been in the
Atlantic sphere. In May of 1940, Nazi Germany suddenly blitzed across Western
Europe in the wake of the "phoney war" period, further aggravating Navy
attention.
The Navy Gets Friends
Meantime, Secretary of the Navy Frank Knox had become a firm friend of the
very senior and influential Representative Carl Vinson, who had chaired the
House Naval Affairs Committee since 1917. They had gloried in passage of
their long-sought Bill creating a true two-ocean navy in mid-1940.
Historically, the U.S. Navy had begun on the Atlantic. By the 1840s, it had
made various Pacific voyages, the 1850s saw the opening of semi-medieval
Japan by Commodore Matthew Perry, and the rapid growth of a steam-and-steel
navy after the 1870s meant further Pacific attention, due to a need for
coaling stations and bases. This became imperative after the Spanish-American
War produced the Philippines and Guam. Withal, the Navy remained
fundamentally Atlantean in outlook, even through the Great War. Though there
were Pacific ships and postwar finally an official Pacific Fleet, these were
offshoots of the basic navy, which remained Atlantic-oriented. This would now
change radically.
Instead of one fleet in two divisions, there would be two complete fleets,
each with its own wide oceanic responsibilities. Thus the Atlantic and
Pacific Fleets became of equal "rank" and distinct focus. Of the latter, the
distant Asiatic Fleet, which was less fleet than large squadron, was a
subordinate part. Vinson was credited by the Navy itself with knowing more
about the Navy than the Navy did, and was personally responsible for pushing
through Roosevelt-era Congresses its increasing between-wars growth and
preparedness. In 1940 one of these facets was naval aviation. Whether
battleships were built or not, Vinson wanted at least a dozen new carriers,
and 15,000 pilots and places to train them, and got the money. But it
presented a problem. Over in the U.S. Senate, its Naval Affairs Committee
found itself in the peculiar position of wanting to heavily finance rearming
in the face of Navy cautions about overspending. Again, one facet was naval
aviation. On 31 May, Stark was informed that the crucial need for training
planes in the expansion programme meant delays in combat aircraft going to
the enlarged Fleet, which specifically affected patrol squadrons. Stark took
this calculated risk. One result was few big, long-ranging PBY "Catalina"
patrol bombers for Pearl Harbor.
Meantime, Admiral James O. Richardson, in command of the Pacific Fleet, was
ordered to move its headquarters from San Diego, California, to Pearl Harbor.
He liked neither the move nor Knox, a former newspaper magnate. Knox visited
Pearl Harbor and told the press that he believed the base "tremendously well
defended" -- though he told others he knew its defences were inadequate, and
that there was a lack of "war-mindedness" in the fleet, which Richardson took
personally. He told Knox the Pacific Fleet should not base at Pearl Harbor,
but back in its old home of San Diego. Knox did not agree, and on return to
Washington shared this view with another friend, Secretary of War Henry
Stimson, whose opinions and concerns were similar. Stimson told Knox that, as
he saw it, any diplomatic easing-up on Japan by the U.S. would be seen as a
weakness to be exploited.
In October, after a Washington conference, Richardson returned to Pearl
Harbor ordered to assess all Army/Navy defences there. His report began by
noting that "If war eventuates with Japan, it is believed easily possible
that hostilities would be initiated by a surprise attack upon the Fleet or
the Naval Base at Pearl Harbor." He further asserted that the priorities of
such an attack would be, first, aerial bombing; second, aerial torpedoes;
followed in order by sabotage, submarine attack, mining, and surface gunnery.
He further urged that the Army increase its defensive aircraft and ground
anti-aircraft capability, and establish an effective air-warning net in the
islands. Knox passed this along to Stimson, who replied two weeks later
expressing "complete concurrence as to the importance of this matter" and
promised to send within six weeks thirty-one obsolete P-36 pursuit planes,
fifty new -- but already obsolescent -- P-40 pursuit planes, increase the
number of AA guns, and to deliver aircraft warning equipment by June.
In April, Knox, Stark, Stimson, Marshall, and King conferred with Roosevelt.
King wanted more ships, and Stimson urged sending the entire fleet into the
Atlantic. Marshall concurred, saying that in his view Pearl Harbor was
invincible whether any ships were there or not, and noted in his diary that
Knox agreed. The security of Pearl Harbor was not examined.
By early August of 1940 eight Purple machines had been built. Two each went
to the Army and Navy, and British Prime Minister Winston S. Churchill got
one. In January of 1941, a sixth Purple Machine went to Admiral Thomas Hart,
commanding the Asiatic Fleet. The same month saw Knox and Stark among ten
secrecy-sworn men who began to get personal copies of MAGIC intercepts. That
summer, the seventh machine went to MacArthur in the Philippines. None were
sent to Pearl Harbor, nor were their respective Army and Navy commanders made
privy to direct Magic intercepts.