TIME: Afternoon to midnight (1612-2355)
WEATHER/VISIBILITY/SEA STATE: Fair/Good to Poor/Small to Moderate Swells. 
SURPRISE: none. 
MISSION: Allies to intercept and destroy invasion convoy; Japanese to protect convoy

Situation Map 1600 hours and sinking locations

By the last week of February Java was the only significant Dutch island remaining in Allied hands.   To the battered and demoralized defenders, there was no doubt the Japanese were coming and coming soon.   In fact two invasion convoys were already at sea – the Western Invasion Fleet sailed on February 18 from Camranh Bay in Indochina and the Eastern Fleet on the 19th from Jolo, Philippines. ( - 1 - )  Allied intelligence advised Vice-Admiral Helfrich, the commander of ADBAFLOAT, of the approaching armadas, and on the 21st he allocated the maritime defense of his island by creating two strike forces, one based at Batavia’s port, Tandjong Priok in the west and the other at Surabaya in the east. ( - 2 - )   On the 25th a Dutch Catalina spotted the Eastern Invasion Fleet.  Consequently, Doorman’s Eastern Strike Force was reinforced on February 26 by a Royal Navy contingent from the Western Force. ( - 3 - )  On this day the first and only conference was held between the captains and staff of the Eastern Strike Force, a one-hour session where in they agreed to sortie that evening.   Sortie they did to spend that night and the following morning fruitlessly sweeping the north coast of eastern Java and Madura and adjacent waters north to Bawean Island, one hundred miles due north of Surabaya.  Unfortunately, they were searching just a little too far south and they did not receive word of a high-level strike carried out by B-17s on the Eastern Invasion Force that day

 What remained of the Western Strike Force also probed its area of responsibility on the 26th, also fruitlessly.  Upon returning to Batavia on the 27th, they were ordered to retreat to Ceylon.  With the exception of Evertsen (a late addition to the force) they successfully accomplished this retreat via the Sunda Strait a day ahead of the Western Invasion Force’s arrival.

The Eastern Invasion Force, a convoy of 41 transports accompanied by the Second Escort Force with two light cruisers and fourteen destroyers was only about 60 miles north of Surabaya by 1020 on the 27th.  Rear-Admiral Takagi, overall commander aboard Nachi, accompanied by Haguro and two more destroyers lagged more than 150 miles behind.   Apparently he did not anticipate much resistance: “The 20 mile long convoy was quite a spectacle. An obvious laxity prevailed in the transports with their ill-trained crews.  Many transports emitted huge clouds of black smoke from their funnels . . . Most disturbing, however, was the dreadfully slow pace of the trailing heavy cruisers.” ( - 4 - )   This confidence was disturbed when Japanese planes sighted the Allied strike force shortly thereafter, heading on an 80? course at 12 knots.   This sighting was confirmed about two hours later by one of Nachi’s scout planes whereupon Admiral Takagi ordered the convoy to turn north so he could close the gap.  At 1340 he received an additional report that the Allies were returning to base and so had the convoy swing back to its southern course.  It did not stay on this heading for long.

  At 1357, February 27, a Dutch scout plane finally fixed the exact position of the Eastern Invasion Force only fifty miles north of Surabaya.  (And, more importantly, got the word of its sighting into the right hands.)   At 1427 Admiral Doorman had just cleared the swept channel in the minefield outside Surabaya when he received word of this sighting along with orders from Admiral Helfrich to engage.   He reversed course almost immediately, and turned back to sea, making the signal: “Am proceeding to intercept enemy, follow me.”   The haste and lack of planning with which this action was taken has been criticized in American sources, but given the fact that the enemy was less than two hours streaming time north, it was a reasonable decision.  With a little ordinary luck Doorman’s haste could have resulted in a great victory. ( - 5 - )   But the luck of the Dutch, so bad that day, (and throughout the war in general) didn’t change.   A Japanese snoop reported the Allied turnabout.   Takagi seemed to finally wake up to his danger.  The two heavy cruisers and the two destroyers screening them finally increased speed while the convoy itself turned north once again. 
 

TABLE 1.4 - FORCES ENGAGED - BATTLE OF JAVA SEA

 
Fates:
D1: light or superficial damage
D2: moderate damage
D3: heavy damage
D4: disabled
 

Table 1.5 demonstrates just how great the Japanese superiority in weapons really was.  They had a 25% advantage in guns of 4” or more (127 to 95) and a 63% more guns of 5” and more (123 to 45).  They had a 36% advantage in the sheer number of pounds of ordnance they could fling per minute against their foe.  They had a 44% advantage in the number of torpedo tubes and this advantage was in fact far greater because their ships could reload quickly torpedoes while remaining in action, and most of their  torpedoes were the reliable and destructive “Long Lance.” 24 Inch (610 mm) Type 93.   Allied torpedoes had neither the range nor the punch of this famous weapon; moreover, the American torpedoes, half the Allied total, were criminally defective in the first years of the Pacific War. 
 

TABLE 1.5 – COMPARATIVE TORPEDO CAPABILITIES    Nation  Type Warhead Wgt (lbs) Range (yds) At knots Japan  610 mm 8th yr 759 20,000 28 Japan  610 mm 93 1080 44,000 36 Great Britain 533 mm Mk IX 810 15,000 35 Netherlands 533 mm 350 13,000 28 USA 533 mm Mk 8 212 14,000 27

 
The Japanese advantage in material factors was only one aspect of their superiority.  Two days before the battle Doorman reported moral had collapsed in the fleet.  This might have been an exaggeration, but the Allies had enjoyed scant success to temper the gloom of the Japanese advance; their strength had been whittled away by air attacks, accidents and general wear and tear.  The men of the fleet had had no rest from their abortive sortie the night and morning before; Houston’s crew, for example, had stood twelve-hour watches at battle stations for two nights running.  “The men who manned the old “four-pipers” were dog-tired, and their ships were tired.  The strain of weeks of campaigning without a letup was beginning to tell in haggard features and tight nerves. ( - 6 - )  The Allied fighting men had the strong suspicion their position was hopeless.  Their ships were lacking maintenance and in some cases damaged.  Adding to the human and material stain were organizational problems. The units in the Strike Force came from three navies, (considering the Royal Navy and the Royal Australian Navy the same for this purpose) speaking two languages and had not evolved common tactics, much less mutually intelligible codes or signals.  The only factor to offset the overwhelming catalog of Japanese advantages was determination.  The carelessly confident, almost arrogant approach of the convoy has been described.  The Dutch, on the other hand, were down to their last battle and knew it. During World War II no other Admiral fought a major sea-battle with the grim determination Doorman displayed in his conduct of this battle.

As they sortied north Doorman deployed his force in three parallel columns, heading west by northwest (315?). The three Royal Navy destroyers led, screening the cruiser column De Ruyter, Houston, Exeter, Perth and Java to starboard, while the two Dutch and four American destroyers steamed to the port and a little behind the cruisers.  Doorman restricted the speed of the entire force to 26 knots because this was Kortenaer’s best speed; she was still having propulsion problems caused by her grounding prior to the Battle of Badung Strait.  “Such an unorthodox deployment of forces suggested Doorman knew little about proven naval tactics. . . “ ( - 7 - )  Generally destroyers would be positioned to screen the main body and deliver torpedo attacks while the light cruisers would proceed the heavies in the column, grouping guns by range. 

 The Allies were about a half-hour clear of the Surabaya minefield when, at 1530, an air raid forced the ships to disperse.   The Allies had only just reformed their force when, twenty minutes later, Jintsu leading Yukikaze, Tokitsukaze, Amatsukaze and Hatsukaze sighted the masts of the Allied force.   The Japanese knew the Allies were coming – spotting reports were received at 1500 and 1510, the first of which caused Admiral Takagi, to order his transports to turn back north.  This movement wasn’t fully accomplished until 1530.  Jintsu could see the transports to the north and the Allied cruisers 30,000 yards to the south.  She turned and led her destroyers due south toward the Allied column, although the odds were certainly against her.  Then, nine minutes later, Nachi and Haguro screened by Ushio, Sazanami, Yamakaze and Kawakaze hove into view, having caught up to the battle just in time.  Additional reinforcements consisting of Naka leading Murasame, Samidare, Harukaze, Yudachi, Asagumo and Minegumo sailing south parallel 13,000 yards west of the heavy cruisers, were also on the way.   At 1600 Jintsu turned her group west to parallel the Allies.  By 1605 the heavy cruiser group was only 13,000 yards north of the Jintsu. 

Electra in the Allied van sighted Jintsu by 1612.  Jintsu opened the action four minutes later at 18,000 yards. By 1617 Nachi had joined the fray from 28,000 yards although her initial salvos fell 2,000 yards short of their target.   At 1621 Doorman bent his column 20° to the west to course 295° apparently concerned that the Japanese might cross his T. 

By 1627 all the Japanese columns were steaming west, parallel to the Allies.  The Houston and Exeter opened fire at about 1620.  Houston used red dye to mark the fall of her shells. The immense blood-red columns of water created by her near misses caused some nervousness on the bridge of the Nachi where Takagi, a submariner by training, and his aide, Nagasawa, were experiencing their first surface action.   Both Houston and Perth claimed hits in this initial long range duel, but the first hits were scored by the Japanese when they landed a 8” shell on De Ruyter at 1631 and again at 1653.  Both shells were duds.   At 1629 Doorman turned further to the west to a heading of 248?, apparently still concerned that the Japanese columns might cross his T with their seven-knot advantage in speed. 

Admiral Nishimura commanding Naka and the destroyers of Division 4 judged that his force was not suited for a long-range gunnery duel.  He led his column south, southwest across the bows of the other two Japanese columns and by 1630 he was closest to the Allies..  At 1633 Naka launched four long lance torpedoes at a range of 15,000 yards.  The six destroyers of his division followed suit between 1640 and 1645 sending another 27 torpedoes toward the Allies from ranges between 15,000 to 13,000 yards.  Haguro initiated a torpedo attack of her own at 1652, launching another eight at a range of 22,000 yards.  Nachi was unable to add her contribution to this torpedo barrage because a valve left accidentally open had bleed all the air pressure from her tubes. 

All the while, the gunnery duel continued.  Houston was pumping salvos from her 8” batteries at the rate of five or six a minute.  De Ruyter, with her impressive forecastle and masts, and Exeter, second ship in line, seemed to be the favorite targets of the Japanese and were continuously straddled.  On the Allied side observers on the Houston, Exeter and Perth all agreed that the Haguro suffered multiple hits, was set afire and even sank. ( - 8 - )   The Japanese torpedo barrage – their first mass torpedo attack of the war – was a qualified failure: only one torpedo fired by Haguro struck a target, the Dutch destroyer Kortenaer.

At 1657 an Allied air strike, three A 20s escorted by eight Brewster Buffaloes flew over the battle and attacked the Japanese transports.  They scored no results.  Hara claims that Zeros jumped this strike and shot every allied plane down, but pictures taken by one Allied pilot survive.  Doorman’s pleas for air support had gone unheeded, apparently because of British influence that insisted the air arm be a completely separate force from the naval arm and follow its completely separate program.  Eight fighters, even Brewster Buffaloes, could have made a helpful contribution by shooting down the cruiser floatplanes deployed so effectively by the Japanese, but that was not to be. 

By 1702 Takagi could see to the north a forest of masts and realized that the battle was drifting dangerously close to his transports.  His heavy cruisers were still maintaining a conservative 20,000 yards from the Allied cruiser column and spending tremendous amounts of ammunition without results so he ordered all ships to close and charge the enemy.  At about this same time Doorman came to a similar conclusion and turned his column slightly north toward the Japanese.   As the two forces closed range fortune favored the Japanese.  First Houston was hit by a dud that caused her to temporarily reduce speed.  Then, several minutes later, the battle’s turning point occurred.  At 1708 Nachi hit Exeter hard – the shell penetrated to her boiler room taking six of her eight boilers out of line, causing her to lurch out of formation to port, on fire and rapidly losing speed.   The three cruisers following Exeter assumed she was turning in accordance to orders, most likely to comb the torpedo wakes that had begun to appear in the Allied midst, and they turned away as well.  De Ruyter continued on for several moments alone. 

The Allies, ignorant of the range of the Japanese Type 93 torpedo believed submarines fired the salvos that made the sea seem “alive with torpedoes running from all quarters” ( - 9 - )  not ships barely visible on the distant horizon.  Perth, privy to communication channels with Exeter the other cruisers didn’t share, realized the Royal Navy cruiser was stricken and further disordered the formation by circling around her making smoke.  The sea around the milling Allied ships was punctuated by random eruptions caused by the torpedoes as they exploded at the end of their runs.  Than, at 1713, one torpedo met something more substantial: Kortenaer.  Hammered midships by a half ton of explosives, the Dutch destoryer broke in two and sank almost immediately.   The Allies were in complete disarray by this point.  De Ruyter finally turned south to find her missing flotilla. Takagi believed he had won the battle and ordered his transports to turn south.   In the first hour of action up to 1720, the Japanese fired 1,271 rounds of 8” shells and scored five hits, only one of which was effective.  The Allies didn’t do so well. Any hits they might have landed were duds and not acknowledged by the Japanese. 

It took Doorman almost twenty minutes to regain control of his fleet.  Exeter, screened by Withe de With and the three British destroyers streamed south, southeast at about five knots.  De Ruyter circled around flying her “follow me” flag and repositioned herself at the head of the remaining cruisers and the American destroyers on a heading south by southeast, ahead and to the starboard of Exeter. She turned back northeast around 1725, cutting across the course of Exeter.   By this time visibility was poor.  The Allies had been making smoke, the Exeter was burning and twilight was deepening.  The Japanese columns were at times invisible.  The Japanese did not suffer from this condition to the same extent thanks to their spotter planes. 

As the Exeter limped away, Jintsu and her eight destroyers, with the Naka and six destroyers south and slightly west of the Jintsu group gathered to the northwest to finish her off. 

At 1745 the Allied cruisers emerged from the smoke on their northerly heading to see the this attack forming up.   Moreover, the Japanese heavy cruisers, bearing east were crossing Doorman’s T.  As they did so, they reopened fire from about 19,500 yards.   Doorman ordered the British destroyers to counterattack the Japanese light forces that were coming on hard in four columns.   Jintsu’s eight destroyers steamed east-southeast in two columns of four, about 2,000 yards apart and about 6,000 yards southwest of the heavy cruisers.  Jintsu herself was on the starboard side of the two columns equally distant from the Naka & her six destroyers also bearing east-southeast. 

The second mass torpedo attack began at 1748 and lasted until 1807.   The Nachi was first to launch at Exeter from long range.  The light cruiser leaders fired next at 1750 from 18,500 yards  (Naka) and 1754  (Jintsu) before turning away.  The Jintsu's destroyers launched one after the other as they reached 15,000 yards and reversed course.  The Naka destroyers closed to 10,000 yards except for the Asagumo and Minegumo which continued independently to 6,500 yards before launching.  The British destroyers Encounter and Electra swung first south, then east and finally northeast to meet this threat, breaking through the smoke to take on the two light cruisers and fourteen destroyers.  The Minegumo and Encounter exchanged fire between 1800 and 1810 on a parallel course at ranges down to 3,000 yards without inflicting damage.  Electra, however, scored a direct hit on the Asagumo’s engine room from 5,000 yards, which caused her to go dead in the water.  Electra also landed one shell on Jintsu which did light damage, killing one and wounding four.  As Asagumo slowed to a stop, she got her revenge and then some with two serious hits on Electra shortly after 1800.   The British destroyer, heavily on fire, sank at 1816; the American submarine S38 rescued 54 of her crew the next morning.  Tokitsukaze was also hit by shellfire in this action.  The Japanese fired 92 torpedoes in this attack without scoring a single hit. ( - 10 - )

The De Ruyter column made a full circle and by 1750 resumed a southeast heading parallel to the Exeter and her two escorts.   Doorman instructed the American destroyers to cover his withdrawal at 1808, an order the American interpreted offensively.   From 1810 the four American destroyers charged almost due north to within 10,000 yards of the Japanese cruisers.   They fired their starboard torpedoes at 1822 and then turned and discharged their port torpedoes as well, launching 24 in all.  Chased by Japanese salvos, they then hurried back to the south. ( - 11 - )   Perhaps this attack encouraged Takagi to turn his force north.  However, he had the Surabaya lighthouse in sight and more likely, was concerned with mines and submarines.  At about the same time Perth claimed a hit on Haguro igniting a large fire on her catapult, but otherwise doing no damage. 

At 1820 as the sun set, it appeared the battle was over.  The Japanese were on a northerly course while the Allies were heading south.   Takagi, with his destroyers were low on fuel and conscious of his primary task, to see the convoy (only 30 miles northwest of his position) through to Java, ordered the transports south once again. 

Doorman was not ready to give up Java so easily, however.  He sent Exeter back to Surabaya  escorted by Witte de With.   The main force continued southeast for several minutes until all Japanese ships had disappeared in the dark.  At 1831 he signaled “Follow Me” and swung back initially to the northeast, and then northwest, hoping to surprise the transports in the darkness. 

The Japanese were ignorant of the Allied turn, but acted under the assumption they might make another attempt against the transports.  Moreover, that had two spotter planes in the air.  At 1920 the Japanese were proved correct when the Jintsu column with eight destroyers sighted the De Ruyter column with Houston, Perth, Java and the Jupiter screening to port and the four American destroyers to starboard rear.  The two forces were on a parallel course heading north with the Japanese 17,500 yards to port.  The Nachi and Haguro were also to the port, slightly north of the Allies at a range of 16,000 yards stopped and recovering seaplanes.   Perth and Houston opened fire at 1933 and Jintsu replied with four torpedoes.   Observing this launch, the Allied ships turned individually to starboard at 1936.  The Japanese increased speed, made smoke and withdrew northeast.  Apparently the Allies never sighted the heavy cruisers although Nachi briefly opened fire at 1937.  The short engagement was quickly over with neither side suffering any damage. 

Doorman, knowing there would be no future opportunities to defend Java, attempted to circle around the Japanese by taking his force inshore along the Java coast.  At 2100 the four American destroyers, out of torpedoes and low on fuel, continued in their practice of interpreting Doorman’s instructions independently returned to Surabaya. 
( - 12 - )     At 2125, just as Doorman was turning his force back to the north, Jupiter struck a Dutch mine, exploded and sank about four hours later.  At 2200 the force came upon survivors from Kortenaer.  Encounter was detached and rescued 113 of her crew. 

These actions cost Doorman his entire destroyer force.   Without a screen the four Allied cruisers proceeded north until they were sighted by a lookout on the Nachi at 2302 at a range of 16,000 yards.  At this time the Nachi and Haguro were headed south southwest.  They swung to the port toward the Allies and assumed a parallel course heading due north.   The Allies opened fire at 2310 on the Japanese heavy units.  The Japanese didn’t return fire until 2321.   At 2322 Nachi launched eight torpedoes, followed one minutes later by Haguro with a salvo of four.  The range was approximately 14,000 yards.  In contrast to the hundreds of torpedoes launched previously, these told.  The De Ruyter was hit aft at 2332 by one of Haguro’s four, exploding her ammunition and killing Doorman along with 344 of his crew.  She sank very quickly.   Two minutes later one of Nachi’s spread struck Java.  She took an hour and a half to sink.  Doorman’s last orders to the Houston and Perth were to retire to Batavia and ignore survivors. 

The Battle of the Java Sea lasted seven hours due to the determination of Admiral Doorman.  His handling of his fleet indicated that he felt any risk justified regardless of the odds or the unlikely probability of success; he demanded a decisive result and he got one.  The long range shooting on both sides was generally ineffective, despite the spotting aircraft the Japanese were able to employ.  Collectively the Japanese heavy cruisers fired 1,619 8” shells, about two thirds their total supply and obtained only five hits, four of which were duds.  The light cruisers added an additional 221 5.5” shells to this bombardment with no hits (save perhaps on Electra).  The Allied cruisers may have scored only once, although they obtained many straddles.  The torpedo attacks made by both forces were also ineffective until the final Japanese salvo.   Despite the Japanese reputation for excellence in torpedo tactics and the superior qualities of their weapons, they only obtained three hits out of 152 torpedoes fired, a 2% hit rate..   The Allies lost two light cruisers and one destroyer to torpedoes all launched by the heavy cruisers, one destroyer accidentally by mining, and one destroyer to gunfire One heavy cruiser was heavily damaged by gunfire.  The Japanese suffered one destroyer moderately damaged by destroyer gunfire and another lightly damaged.  One heavy cruiser and one light cruiser also suffered inconsequential damage. ( - 13 - )  The Japanese convoy continued and began landing troops at  Kragan forty miles west of Surabaya the next day.

Bibliography:
    Brown, David, Warship Losses of World War II, Annapolis, Maryland: Naval Institute Press, 1995

    Dull, Paul, A Battle History of the Imperial Japanese Navy (1941 -- 1945), Annapolis, Maryland: Naval Institute Press, 1982
 
    Greene, Jack, War At Sea, Pearl Harbor to Midway, New York, New York: Gallery Books, 1988
    Grove, Eric, Sea Battles in Close Up World War 2, Volume 2, Annapolis, Maryland: Naval Institute Press, 1993

    Hara, Tameichi, Japanese Destroyer Captain, New York, New York: Ballantine Books, 1961

    Lacroix, Eric and Linton Wells III, Japanese Cruisers of the Pacific War, Annapolis, Maryland: Naval Institute Press, 1997

    Morison, Samuel Eliot, History of United States Naval Operations in World War II, Volume III, The Rising Sun in the Pacific, Boston, Massachusetts: Little Brown and Company, 1988

    Prados, John, Combined Fleet Decoded, New York, New York: Random House, 1995
 
    Rohwer, Juergen, and Gerhard Huemmelchen, Chronology of the War at Sea 1939 -- 1945, Annapolis, Maryland: Naval Institute Press, 1992

    Roscoe, Theodore, United States Destroyer Operations in World War II, Annapolis, Maryland: Naval Institute Press, 1953

    Roskill, Stephen W., The War at Sea, Volume II, London: HMSO, 1956
 
    Toland, John, But not in Shame, New York, New York: Random House, 1961

    Van der Vat, Dan, The Pacific Campaign, New York, New York: Simon and Schuster, 1991

    Van Oosten, F.C., The Battle of the Java Sea, Annapolis, Maryland: Naval Institute Press, 1976

    Winslow, Walter G., The Ghost that Died at Sunda Strait, Annapolis, Maryland: Naval Institute Press, 1984

                       -        , The Fleet the Gods Forgot, Annapolis, Maryland: Naval Institute Press, 1982